The Syrian Druze have hit the headlines due to clashes in southern Syria which have left hundreds dead, and because of Israeli strikes on the country in support of this community. But who exactly are the Syrian Druze and what is their relationship with Israel?
The Syrian Druze, a non-Muslim religious and ethnic minority comprising 3–5% of Syria’s population (approximately 700,000–800,000 people before the civil war), are primarily concentrated in the southern province of Suwayda, with smaller communities in Damascus and surrounding areas.
Their esoteric, monotheistic faith, an 11th-century offshoot of Ismailism, incorporates elements of Gnosticism and Neoplatonism, emphasising secrecy and loyalty to their tightly knit community.
The Druze do not follow mainstream Islamic practices, and only the initiated have access to their sacred texts.
In Suwayda, often called the “Druze heartland,” over 90% of the population is Druze, and their strong communal bonds and history of self-reliance have shaped their response to Syria’s turbulent political landscape.
The Syrian Druze in the post-Assad era
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 and the rise of the Islamic-leaning new government under Ahmed al-Sharaa have heightened tensions for the Druze, who fear marginalisation under the new authorities.
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During Syria’s 14-year civil war, the Druze maintained relative autonomy in Suwayda, forming militias to fend off threats, such as the 2018 Islamic State attacks that killed over 200 Druze.
However, recent violence, particularly since July 2025, has thrust Suwayda into chaos, with clashes between Druze militias, Bedouin tribes, and Syrian government forces escalating sectarian divides.
The conflict was ignited on July 11, 2025, by the kidnapping of a Druze merchant along the Damascus–Suwayda highway, triggering tit-for-tat violence.
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the unrest has claimed 250–350 lives, including Druze, Bedouin and government fighters.
Divisions within the Druze community
The Druze in Suwayda are reportedly divided into three main factions, each with distinct stances toward the new Syrian government.
A group led by a prominent Druze spiritual leader, Sheikh Hamoud Al-Hinawi, supports cooperation with the Syrian government to restore order.
Al-Hinawi has emphasised the need for state institutions to stabilise Suwayda, warning that the ongoing violence is a “matter of life and death” for the Druze. His faction seeks integration within Syria while maintaining community autonomy.
Laith Al-Balaous leads another pro-government faction. Like Al-Hinawi, Laith advocates for state intervention to end the security chaos, aligning with efforts to disarm non-state actors and restore governance.
On the other hand, the dominant faction is led by Hikmat Al-Hijri which is allegedly backed by Israel, both militarily and financially.
Al-Hijri has reportedly declared opposition to the new Syrian government, citing ideological and sectarian differences, and has called for Israeli protection.
The dominance of Al-Hijri’s faction is alleged to have led to rampant theft, affecting public stadiums, shops, and roads, and a surge in kidnappings for ransom.
These actions sparked tensions with neighbouring Bedouin tribes, particularly after tribal members were abducted along the Damascus–Suwayda highway, fueling the current conflict.
The Syrian government’s inability to intervene, partly due to Israeli threats, allowed insecurity to spread, pushing Bedouin tribes to take up arms in self-defence.
Casualties mounted, with Al-Hijri’s forces reportedly shelling Bedouin villages with rockets and mortars.
Role of Israel
Israel’s role has been pivotal. Positioning itself as a protector of the Druze, Israel has conducted airstrikes on Syrian military targets in Suwayda and Damascus, claiming to prevent government forces from threatening the Druze.
In July 2025, Israeli strikes killed civilians and security personnel, according to Syrian reports, and Israel seized a UN-patrolled buffer zone in the Golan Heights in December 2024 to enforce a demilitarised zone south of Damascus.
These actions have drawn condemnation from Syrian authorities and some Druze leaders, who accuse Israel of exploiting sectarian tensions to weaken Damascus and secure strategic interests.
The situation escalated dramatically when Al-Hijri’s forces allegedly ambushed a Syrian military convoy, killing all personnel, mutilating their bodies, and circulating videos with sectarian insults targeting Syria’s Sunni majority.
This act sparked nationwide outrage, prompting the Damascus government to resolve the Suwayda crisis by disarming all factions, restricting weapons to state forces, and declaring non-compliant groups as outlaws.
While Al-Hinawi and Al-Balaous expressed readiness to cooperate, Al-Hijri reportedly rejected this approach, insisting on governing Suwayda independently with his forces.
The Syrian Druze and Israel
The relationship between the Syrian Druze and Israel is shaped by historical and geopolitical factors, particularly the 1967 Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, where approximately 23,000 Syrian Druze remain.
Most Golan Druze have rejected Israeli citizenship, identifying as Syrian and maintaining ties with Suwayda’s Druze.
In contrast, Israel’s 152,000 Druze citizens, including those in the Galilee, are loyal to the state, serving in the IDF and advocating for their Syrian kin.
Many Syrian Druze, particularly leaders like Bassem Abu Fakhr of Rijal al-Karama, reject Israel’s protection, emphasising their Syrian identity and accusing Israel of using the Druze as a pretext for territorial expansion or to counter HTS and other Islamist groups.
Israel’s overtures, such as allowing Druze religious leaders to cross into the Golan in March 2025 and offering aid, aim to build alliances with minorities but risk alienating Syrian Druze who prioritise national sovereignty.
Analysts suggest Israel’s actions align with a strategy to fragment Syria into ethno-religious entities, weakening Damascus and securing the Golan Heights.
Current challenges and outlook
The Syrian Druze face a precarious future, balancing autonomy with integration into the new Syria.
Clashes with Bedouin tribes, government forces, and Israeli interventions have heightened tensions.
While ceasefires, such as the one on July 17, 2025, involving Syrian troop withdrawals and Druze-led security, offer temporary relief, the situation remains volatile.
As Syria’s new government seeks to consolidate power, the Druze’s ability to secure autonomy while avoiding external manipulation will be critical to Suwayda’s stability.
